The	Three	Circles	of	Consciousness Uriah	Kriegel Forthcoming	in	M.	Guillot	&	M.	Garcia-Carpintero,	The	Sense	of	Mineness,	OUP Introduction/Abstract A	widespread	assumption	in	current	philosophy	of	mind	is	that	a	conscious	state's phenomenal	properties	vary	with	its	representational	contents.	In	this	paper,	I	present (rather	dogmatically)	an	alternative	picture	that	recognizes	two	kinds	of	phenomenal properties	that	do	not	vary	concomitantly	with	content.	First,	it	admits	phenomenal properties	that	vary	rather	with	attitude:	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	see	rain	is	phenomenally different	from	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	remember	(indistinguishable)	rain,	which	is	different again	form	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	visualize	(indistinguishable)	rain	–	where	these differences	cannot	be	traced	back	to	variations	in	content.	Secondly,	there	is	a	kind	of phenomenal	property	that	varies	neither	with	content	nor	with	attitude	but	is	altogether invariant	across	all	conscious	states:	a	substantive	phenomenal	commonality	among	what it	is	like	for	me	to	see,	remember,	and	visualize	rain,	cats,	or	dogs.	This	substantive commonality,	I	will	suggest,	is	the	for-me-ness	component	of	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	have any	of	these	experiences.	I	will	close	by	discussing	the	interrelations	among	these	three concentric	layers	of	phenomenality:	content-based,	attitude-based,	and	for-me-ness. 1 Content-Based	Phenomenality It	is	commonly	thought	that	there	is	a	tight	connection	between	a	conscious	state's phenomenal	character	and	its	representational	content.	By	'phenomenal	character,'	I	mean what	it	is	like	for	the	subject	to	be	in	the	relevant	state;	by	'representation	content,'	I	mean what	the	state	represents.	Given	an	understanding	of	phenomenal	character	and representational	content,	we	may	understand	the	notions	of	a	'phenomenal	property'	and 'content	property'	as	follows.	Suppose	C	is	a	conscious	state	with	properties	P1,	.	.	.	,	Pn.	Call a	property	Pi	a	'phenomenal	property'	of	C	if	the	fact	that	C	instantiates	Pi	contributes constitutively	to	what	it	is	like	for	the	subject	to	be	in	C,	in	the	sense	that	the	following counterfactual	obtains:	if	C	had	not	instantiated	Pi,	C's	phenomenal	character	would	ipso facto	be	different.	(I	include	the	'ipso	facto'	requirement	to	exclude	cases	where	change	in 2 some	property	would	merely	causally	entrain	changes	in	phenomenal	character.)	Call	a property	Pi	a	'content	property'	of	C	if	the	fact	that	C	instantiates	Pi	contributes constitutively	to	what	C	represents,	in	the	sense	that	if	C	had	not	instantiated	Pi,	C's representational	content	would	ipso	facto	be	different.	(I	am	using	'represents'	nonfactively	here:	when	you	hallucinate	a	lemon,	what	your	hallucination	represents	is	a	lemon, not	nothing.) The	philosophy	of	mind	of	the	past	quarter-century	has	been	intensely	interested	in potential	dependence	or	grounding	relations	between	phenomenal	and	content	properties. Suppose	C	represents	purple	(a	purple	surface	or	volume,	say),	and	there	is	a	purplish	way it	is	like	for	its	subject	to	be	in	C.	Then	C	has	a	content	property	Pc	(the	property	of representing	purple)	and	also	a	phenomenal	property	Pp	(the	property	of	there	being	a purplish	way	it	is	like	for	the	subject	to	be	in	C).	The	facts	that	C	has	Pc	and	that	it	has	Pp have	seemed	to	many	to	have	something	to	do	with	each	other.	Although	some	have	argued that	the	two	could	come	apart	(e.g.,	Peacocke	1983,	Block	1996),	most	philosophers	have tended	to	think	that	they	cannot:	a	conscious	state	instantiates	Pc	if	and	only	if	it instantiates	Pp.	But	this	kind	of	biconditional	raises	a	certain	Euthyphro	question:	does	C have	Pc	because	it	has	Pp	(does	it	represent	purple	because	there	is	a	purplish	way	it	is	like to	be	in	it),	or	does	it	have	Pp	because	it	has	Pc	(there	is	a	purplish	way	it	is	like	to	be	in	it because	it	represents	purple)?	Thinking	about	this	Euthyphro	question	in	terms	of metaphysical	dependence,	we	can	distinguish	four	prima	facie	approaches	to	it: (1) Content	first:	C's	having	Pp	(the	phenomenal	property)	asymmetrically	depends upon	C's	having	Pc	(the	content	property). (2) Phenomenality	first:	C's	having	Pc	asymmetrically	depends	upon	C's	having	Pp. (3) No	priority:	C's	having	Pp	and	its	having	Pc	are	mutually	dependent. (4) Independence:	Neither	C's	having	Pp	nor	C's	having	Pc	is	dependent	on	the	other. The	first	position	is	associated	with	so-called	representationalism	or	intentionalism (Dretske	1995,	Byrne	2001).	The	second	is	associated	with	the	'phenomenal	intentionality view'	(Horgan	and	Tienson	2002,	Loar	2003).	The	third	can	come	in	several	varieties,	but one	prominent	option	is	an	'identity	view'	(Chalmers	2004,	Pautz	2010),	whereby	Pc	and	Pp are	ultimately	one	and	the	same	property,	differently	described.	The	fourth	position corresponds	to	what	Horgan	and	Tienson	(2002)	call	'separatism,'	the	view	that	Pc	and	Pp have	nothing	to	do	with	each	other,	metaphysically	speaking.	A	separatist	would	typically deny	the	necessary	correlation	between	phenomenal	and	content	properties,	but	she	can also	accept	the	correlation	and	insist	that	it	does	not	reflect	any	metaphysical	dependence. As	a	purely	sociological	observation,	it	should	be	noted	that	separatism,	once	a widespread	assumption	among	philosophers	of	mind,	has	become	a	minority	position	over the	past	quarter-century.	Most	debates	in	the	area	have	concentrated	on	which	of	the	other 3 three	positions	is	most	plausible:	representationalism,	phenomenal	intentionality,	or	the no-priority	view. This	picture	of	the	logical	geography	requires	some	refinement,	however.	For philosophers	of	both	representationalist	and	phenomenal-intentionality	persuasions	have often	sounded	an	identity-theoretic	note.	Michael	Tye,	a	leading	representationalist,	writes: 'Phenomenal	character	(or	what	it	is	like)	is	one	and	the	same	as	a	certain	sort	of intentional	content'	(Tye	1995:	137;	my	italics).	Terry	Horgan,	a	leading	phenomenal intentionality	theorist,	is	inclined	toward	the	identification	of	Pc	and	Pp	(personal communication).	Yet	Tye	and	Horgan	do	not	seem	to	have	a	'loud	agreement,'	being	simply confused	about	the	fact	that	they	actually	agree	with	one	another.	So	how	should	we	make sense	of	their	disagreement? I	think	the	answer	is	that	disagreement	is,	in	the	first	instance,	on	something	like epistemic	rather	than	metaphysical	priority.	The	representationalist	holds	that	content properties	are	epistemically	more	basic:	we	understand	a	phenomenal	property	by reductively	explaining	it	in	terms	of	some	content	property,	which	in	turn	we	understand in	broadly	information-theoretic	terms,	hence	without	appeal	to	phenomenal	notions.	The phenomenal	intentionalist	proposes	the	opposite	direction	of	epistemic	priority:	we understand	the	content	property	in	terms	of	the	phenomenal	property,	and	grasp	the nature	of	the	latter	through	direct	introspective	acquaintance,	hence	without	recourse	to representation	idiom.	A	third	position	is	that	the	single	property	we	have	here	can	be understood	neither	first	under	its	phenomenal	guise	nor	first	under	its	content	guise;	on the	contrary,	upon	reflection	we	realize	that	the	two	descriptions	must	co-refer,	as	we	are unable	to	grasp	the	phenomenal	property	otherwise	than	as	intentional	or	the	intentional property	otherwise	than	phenomenal. To	summarize,	representationalism	can	be	understood	as	the	disjunction	of	(a)	the claim	that	phenomenal	properties	are	metaphysically	grounded	in	content	properties	and (b)	the	claim	that	phenomenal	properties	are	identical	with	content	properties	but	the phenomenal	description,	or	conception,	of	those	properties	is	epistemically	derivative upon	their	content	description/conception.	The	phenomenal	intentionality	view	is	a	similar metaphysical-priority-or-epistemic-priority	disjunctive	thesis.	And	the	no-priority	view denies	both	metaphysical	and	epistemic	priority. Regardless	of	which	line	one	takes	on	question	of	priority,	many	philosophers	of mind	hold	that	phenomenal	properties	covary	with	content	properties.	More	specifically: Covariance:	For	any	conscious	state	C	and	phenomenal	property	Pp,	there	is	a content	property	Pc,	such	that	C	instantiates	Pp	if	and	only	if	C	instantiates	Pc. As	we	have	seen,	even	the	separatist	can	accept	Covariance,	though	most	likely	she	will	not. 4 2 Attitude-Based	Phenomenality Opponents	of	Covariance	have	often	attempted	to	adduce	instances	of	sensory	qualia	that, they	claim,	go	beyond	conscious	state's	content.	Peacocke	(1983)	argued	that	a	subject	can have	a	visual	experience	of	two	equally	sized	trees,	one	of	which	is	farther	away	from	the other,	such	that	(i)	the	experience	represents	the	two	trees	as	equally	sized	but	(ii)	the sensory	quale	associated	with	each	tree	is	different	(one	'takes	up'	more	of	the	subject's 'visual	field'	than	the	other).	Block	(1996)	argued	that	when	we	rub	our	eyes	long	enough, we	have	'phosphene	experiences'	that	(i)	do	not	represent	anything	but	(ii)	involve	an unmistakable	sensory	quality	of	glowing	blobs	in	our	visual	field. For	reasons	I	do	not	want	to	go	into	here,	I	do	not	believe	that	alleged counterexamples	of	this	kind	work.	All	the	same,	I	contend,	there	are	plenty	of	exceptions to	Covariance,	exceptions	which	have	something	in	common.	These	exceptions	are, however,	of	a	very	different	kind. To	appreciate	the	relevant	kind	of	case,	I	want	to	start	with	a	seemingly	unrelated distinction	between	three	kinds	of	belief	report.	Compare: (B1)	S1	believes	that	there	are	ghosts. (B2)	S2	believes	that	ghosts	exist. (B3)	S3	believes	in	ghosts. The	mental	states	ostensibly	reported	by	B1-3	are	clearly	related:	they	are	all	in	the business	of	doxastically	committing	the	subject	to	the	existence	of	ghosts.	But	if	we	take	the reports'	grammatical	structures	at	face	value,	they	report	mental	states	with	subtly	but importantly	different	intentional	structures.	There	are	live	debates	on	just	how	we	should understand	B1,	but	here	I	want	to	focus	on	B2	and	B3.	Note	that	the	specification	of	what	is believed	in	report	B2	includes	the	word	'exist,'	suggesting	that	existence	shows	up	in	the content	of	S2's	belief.	In	contrast,	in	B3	the	specification	of	what	is	believed	is	one	word	long –	it	is	exhausted	by	'ghosts'	–	and	involves	no	existential	term.	So	as	long	as	we	take	at	face value	the	reports'	grammatical	structure,	then,	it	would	seem	that	S2's	belief	commits	S2	to the	existence	of	ghosts	in	virtue	of	its	content,	whereas	S3's	does	not.	At	the	same	time,	S3's belief	clearly	does	commit	S3	to	the	existence	of	ghosts	(indeed,	that	is	all	believing	in ghosts	does!).	It	follows	that	that	this	existence-commitment	is	not	part	of	the	content	of S3's	mental	state.	Rather,	it	would	seem	to	be	an	aspect	of	the	very	attitude	of	believing	in: to	believe	in	something	is	to	doxastically	commit	to	its	existence.	One	way	to	put	this	is	to say	that	while	S2's	belief	represents	ghosts	as	existing,	S3's	belief	represents-as-existing ghosts.	Here	the	existential	term	is	used	as	a	modification	of	the	verb	'represents,' suggesting	that	existence-commitment	a	mode	or	way	of	representing	rather	than	part	of 5 what	is	represented.	Another	way	to	say	this	is	that	existence-commitment	is	a	content property	of	S2's	belief	but	an	attitudinal	property	of	S3's	belief. Now,	we	may	certainly	refuse	to	take	the	grammars	of	B1-3	at	face	value,	and	so deny	that	existence-commitment	is	ever	an	attitudinal	property	of	our	beliefs.	Still,	the contrast	between	B2	and	B3	is	useful	in	bringing	out	two	different	intentional	structures that	conscious	states	might	potentially	exhibit.	When	a	conscious	state	C	commits	to	the	Fness	of	x,	it	may	be	either	because	C	represents	x	as	F	(where	x's	being	F	is	what	C represents),	or	because	C	represents-as-F	x	(where	what	C	represents	is	only	x,	and	as-F	is how	C	represents	x). With	this	in	the	background,	I	may	state	my	main	claim	in	this	section	as	follows: quite	a	few	of	the	phenomenal	properties	of	our	conscious	states	are	attitudinal	rather	than content	properties,	properties	these	have	not	in	virtue	of	what	they	represent,	but	in	virtue of	how	they	represent.	More	specifically: Contrarian:	For	some	conscious	state	C	and	phenomenal	property	Pp,	there	is	no content	property	Pc,	such	that	C	instantiates	Pp	if	and	only	if	C	instantiates	Pc. I	will	now,	rather	dogmatically,	go	over	a	series	of	phenomenal	properties	that	I	take	to	be attitudinal,	hence	outstrip	content	properties.	I	adopt	the	dogmatic	stance	not	because	I think	the	claims	I	make	are	somehow	obvious,	but	because	space	is	limited	and	I	have argued	for	these	claims	more	fully	elsewhere.	The	exercise	in	this	paper	is	to	pull	together the	results	of	those	disparate	arguments	in	order	to	articulate	a	certain	picture	of	the phenomenal	realm. Consider	first	a	pair	of	subjects	S4	and	S5,	such	that	(i)	S4	sees	my	dog,	(ii)	S5 visualizes	my	dog,	and	(iii)	due	to	extraordinary	circumstances,	the	details,	vivacity,	and determinacy	of	S4's	seeing	are	identical	to	those	of	S5's	visualizing.	On	my	view,	there	is	still a	difference	in	the	overall	phenomenology	of	S4's	and	S5's	experiences.	(Nobody	in	such circumstances	would	be	confused	as	to	whether	s/he	is	perceiving	or	imagining!)	I	want	to say	that	the	difference	between	these	overall	phenomenal	characters	has	to	do	with	the realness	of	that	which	is	represented:	perception	involves	a	subtle	feeling	of	realness	that attaches	to	the	object,	whereas	imagination	does	not,	and	may	even	involve	a	subtle	feeling of	unreality.	And	yet,	I	want	to	claim,	what	is	perceived	or	imagined	is	strictly	the	same:	my dog.	If	so,	the	realness-related	difference	must	be	grounded	in	the	manners	in	which	the two	experiences	represent	my	dog:	while	S4's	experience	represents-as-real	my	dog,	S5's does	not	(and	perhaps	even	represents-as-unreal	my	dog).	This	is	a	difference	in	the experiences'	attitudinal	properties:	S4	does	not	see	my	dog's	realness,	and	S5	does	not visualize	my	dog's	unreality;	they	see/visualize	only	my	dog.	(True	to	my	dogmatic	stance,	I have	not	provided	here	any	argument	for	these	claims.	For	actual	arguments,	see	Kriegel 2015a	Ch.6	and	Arcangeli	&	Kriegel	ms.) 6 A	similar	contrast	attends,	in	my	opinion,	perception	and	episodic	memory.	Suppose S6	sees	the	rain	falling,	while	S7	episodically	remembers	a	qualitatively	indistinguishable rain	(or	remembers	seeing	that	rain).1	Moreover,	suppose	the	circumstances	are sufficiently	odd	that	the	vivacity/determinacy	of	the	two	experiences	matches.	There	are various	differences	between	these	two	experiences,	including	differences	in	functional	role. But	in	addition,	I	contend,	there	is	a	certain	phenomenal	difference,	one	that	seems	to concern	felt	temporal	orientation:	in	remembering	the	rain,	we	experience	it	as	past,	but	in seeing	the	rain,	we	experience	it	as	(in	the)	present.	It	is	because	of	this	felt	temporal orientation	that	each	of	us	would	immediately	know	whether	s/he	is	busy	seeing	or remembering	rain.	Nonetheless,	I	contend,	still	dogmatically,	the	content	of	the	two experiences	is	strictly	the	same:	a	(type-)identical	rain	is	represented.	The	felt	temporal orientation	must	therefore	be	'attitudinally	encoded'	in	these	experiences,	so	to	speak.	We might	say	that	while	S7's	experience	represents-as-past	the	rain,	S6's	represents-as-present the	rain.	(Again,	I	have	offered	no	argument	for	any	of	this.	For	such	an	argument,	see Kriegel	2015b.) It	has	sometimes	been	claimed,	against	representationalists,	that	different perceptual	modalities	can	represent	the	same	features,	but	in	different	ways	(Block	1996, Lopes	2000).	For	example,	we	can	see,	hear,	and	smell	spatial	locations;	the	resulting	visual, auditory,	and	olfactory	experiences	differ	phenomenally	despite	representing	the	same location.	This	might	be	construed	as	a	claim	about	differences	in	phenomenal	attitudinal properties.	There	have	been	responses	from	representationalists	on	this	score,	essentially claiming	that	there	are	environmental	features	we	can	only	see	and	others	we	can	only hear,	and	that	these	modality-specific	features	ensure	that	the	experiences'	respective representational	contents	are	in	fact	different	(Dretske	2000,	Byrne	2001).	Thus,	for	any location	L,	there	is	also	the-look-of-L	and	the-sound-of-L,	and	it	is	these	kinds	of	entity (rather	than	L	itself)	that	the	relevant	visual	and	auditory	experiences	represent. Accordingly,	here	I	do	not	wish	to	assume	that	the	properties	of	being	visual,	being auditory,	and	so	on	are	phenomenal	attitudinal	properties;	but	nor	do	I	wish	to	assume	the opposite.	What	I	would	like	to	insist	on	is	that	in	other	domains,	it	is	hard	to	deny	that parallel	modality-specific	phenomenal	properties	exist. Consider	for	example	the	phenomenology	of	emotional	experience,	such	as	S8's	fear of	a	snake.	It	has	often	been	claimed	that	in	fearing	a	snake,	we	are	experiencing	the	snake as	somehow	dangerous	to	us.	If	S8	did	not	experience	the	snake	as	dangerous,	her experience	would	not	properly	count	as	a	fear.	At	the	same	time,	S8	does	not	fear	that	the snake	is	dangerous;	no,	she	simply	fears	the	snake.	(Nor	does	she	fear	the	snake's dangerousness,	since	what	she	fears	is	a	concrete	thing,	not	an	abstract	entity.)	Plausibly, then,	the	danger-commitment	is	'attitudinally	encoded':	S8's	experience	does	not	represent the	snake	as	dangerous	but	rather	represents-as-dangerous	the	snake.	If	so,	the 7 phenomenal	difference	between	fearing	a	dog	and	loving	him	is	an	attitudinal	rather	than content	difference:	in	both	experiences	a	dog	is	what	the	experience	represents;	the difference	is	in	the	manner	in	which	the	experience	represents	what	it	does.	Crucially,	in this	area	the	move	of	positing	such	intentional	objects	as	the-dangerousness-of-the-dog and	the	loveliness-of-the-dog	is	implausible.	For	what	we	emote	about	seems	to	be manifestly	the	dog	himself:	it	is	the	dog	who	bears	his	teeth	and	barks	at	us,	not	his dangerousness;	it	is	not	the	dangerousness-of-the-dog	that	threatens	to	bite	us,	but	the	dog itself.	(Still	dogmatic,	I	refer	the	reader	to	Kriegel	forthcoming	for	an	argument	to	this effect.) Moods	have	often	been	specially	problematic	for	representationalists.	For	they appear	to	be	somehow	completely	undirected,	that	is,	have	no	representational	content.	In an	attempt	to	defend	a	representationalist	treatment,	it	has	been	suggested	that	although moods	are	not	directed	at	anything	in	particular,	they	nonetheless	have	a	generalized directedness.	What	this	means	is	that	they	represent	properties	of	the	world	as	a	whole: depression	represents	the	world	as	dull,	anxiety	represents	the	world	as	threatening,	and so	on	(Crane	1998,	Seager	1999).	This	account	manages	to	assign	a	representational content	to	moods,	but	it	has	struck	many	as	counterintuitive,	insofar	as	moods	seem typically	to	arise	not	due	to	the	unfortunate	detecting	or	tracking	of	such	global	properties, but	from	within	the	subject's	psyche,	so	to	speak	(Kind	2013).	One	way	to	reconcile	the intentional	character	of	moods	and	their	endogenous	character	might	be	by	going attitudinalist.	We	might	hold,	for	instance,	that	depression	represents-as-dull	the	world, anxiety	represents-as-threatening	the	world,	and	so	on.	Here	all	that	is	'tracked'	or 'detected'	is	the	world;	the	element	of	dullness	or	threateningness	is	'contributed'	by	the subject's	internal	state.	(A	case	for	this	attitudinal	account	of	mood	is	in	Kriegel	Ms.2) Consider	next	desire,	wish,	craving,	and	other	phenomena	of	the	will.	When	S9 desires	(wishes	for,	craves)	chocolate,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	chocolate	appears	good to	her	–	she	experiences	the	chocolate	as	good,	or	as	good	for	her	(not	necessarily	in	a	moral sense!).	Such	'conative	states'	are	goodness-committal	(Stampe	1987)	in	roughly	the	same sense	fear	is	danger-committal	and	belief-in	is	existence-committal.	This	is	the	traditional guise-of-the-good	thesis	(Tenenbaum	2007).	Moreover,	this	goodness-commitment	is	part of	the	phenomenal	character	of	conative	states:	the	desire	feels	like	it	casts	chocolate	in	a positive	light.	On	my	view,	however,	this	goodness-commitment	is	attitudinally	encoded: what	S9	desires	is	not	that	the	chocolate	be	good,	nor	the	chocolate's	goodness;	no,	she simply	desires	the	chocolate.	It	is	what	she	desires	that	she	hopes	to	eat,	and	what	she hopes	to	it	is	the	chocolate,	not	its	goodness.	We	might	say	that	the	desire	casts	chocolate	in a	positive	light	rather	than	casts	light	on	a	positive	chocolate.	That	is:	S9's	state	does	not represent	chocolate	as	good	but	rather	represents-as-good	chocolate.	(For	the	argument, see	Kriegel	2017.) 8 There	is	a	tradition	that	takes	belief,	judgment,	and	all	other	intellectual	activities	to lack	proprietary	phenomenal	character.	Recently,	however,	proponents	of	so-called cognitive	phenomenology	have	claimed	that	at	least	some	cognitive	states,	such	as	making the	judgment	that	I	own	a	private	jet,	have	a	properly	intellectual	phenomenology irreducible	to	the	phenomenology	of	whatever	accompanying	imagery	I	might	experience (Bayne	and	Montague	2011).	One	of	the	main	arguments	for	this	draws	on	the	immediacy of	our	knowledge	of	such	cognitive	states	(Goldman	1993).	It	is	a	notable	fact,	however, that	I	can	know	immediately	not	only	whether	I	judge	that	I	own	a	private	jet	or	that	the weather	is	nice,	but	also	whether	I	judge	that	I	have	a	private	jet	or	desire	that	I	have	a private	jet	(Pitt	2004).	The	latter	two	present	themselves	differently	to	introspection.	What is	the	difference?	One	natural	suggestion	is:	while	the	desire	represents-as-good	my	having a	private	jet,	the	judgment	represents-as-true	(or	perhaps	represents-as-obtaining)	my having	a	private	jet.	Desire	that	p	and	judgment	that	p	represent	the	same	thing,	the	same state	of	affairs	(p),	but	represent	it	in	different	ways:	sub	specie	boni	in	one	case,	sub	specie veri	in	the	other. ge There	are,	in	my	opinion,	many	other,	increasingly	more	subtle	phenomenal	attitudinal properties	in	our	mental	life.	In	particular,	different	types	of	cognitive	state	(judging, accepting,	supposing,	etc.),	different	types	of	conative	state	(desiring,	craving,	wishing), different	types	of	emotional	state	(fear,	anger,	indignation),	different	types	of	mood (depression,	anxiety,	elation)	and	perhaps	different	types	of	perceptual	state	(visual, auditory,	and	so	on)	are	distinguished	by	their	specific	species	of	attitudinal	properties.	But the	above	array	covers	some	of	the	most	robust	and	most	generic	ones:	representing-astrue,	representing-as-good,	representing-as-real/unreal,	representing-as-dangerous, representing-as-threatening,	and	so	on.	We	have	here	an	entire	domain	of	phenomenal properties	that	goes	beyond	the	content	properties	of	conscious	states.	In	other	words,	we have	here	a	whole	slew	of	counterexamples	to	Covariance. If	all	these	counterexamples	are	sitting	right	beneath	our	noses,	how	could	they	be missed	so	easily?	I	speculate	that	this	has	to	do	with	a	combination	of	two	factors:	(i)	the prominence	of	the	'transparency	of	experience'	thesis	(Harman	1990)	in	contemporary philosophy	of	mind	and	(ii)	the	blindness	of	the	transparency	observation	to	the	difference between	representing	x	as	F	and	representing-as-F	x.	I	close	this	section	with	some elaborations	on	this	speculation. Although	the	transparency	claim	is	very	influential,	there	is	no	standard	way	to formulate	it.	Here	are	three	significantly	different	formulations: (T1)	When	we	introspect	our	phenomenal	states,	we	are	only	aware	of	the environmental	features	these	states	represent. 9 (T2)	When	we	introspect	our	phenomenal	states,	we	are	only	aware	of	these	states' representational	contents. (T3)	When	we	introspect	our	phenomenal	states,	we	are	only	aware	of	these	states' representational	properties. Representationalists	of	a	phenomenal-externalist	bent	(Dretske	1996,	Lycan	2001)	have tended	to	focus	on	T1,	though	sometimes	the	more	modest	T2	is	leaned	upon.	Phenomenal intentionality	proponents	have	sometimes	stressed	a	variation	on	T2	(Horgan	and	Tienson 2002,	Kriegel	2007)	that	we	might	formulate	as	follows:	when	we	introspect	our phenomenal	states,	we	are	always	aware	of	them	qua	contentful	states.	Now,	under	certain assumptions,	T3	might	certainly	seem	equivalent	to	T2;	but	once	we	recognize	attitudinal properties	of	the	form	representing-as-F,	the	equivalence	disappears.	For	in	a	sense	such properties	are	representational	as	well:	they	concern	ways	of	representing	an	object,	after all.	They	are	not	purely	vehicular	properties	that	can	survive	the	destruction	of	the representation.	Take	away	the	fear's	representation	of	a	snake	and	you	tak	away	its representation-as-dangerous	of	the	snake.	So	the	property	of	representing-as-dangerous	is in	a	very	real	sense	a	representational	property	–	though	not	a	property	a	state	has	in virtue	of	its	representational	content. And	yet,	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	are	very	different	from	contentbased	ones.	For	phenomenal	states	do	not	inherit	these	properties	from	the	character	of	the represented	environmental	features.	On	the	contrary,	the	environmental	features	are experienced	in	a	certain	light	in	virtue	of	the	way	the	states	do	their	representing:	the chocolate	is	experienced	in	a	positive	light	because	the	stance	we	take	toward	it	is	that	of desire	rather	than	(say)	fear.	If	we	rather	feared	the	chocolate,	our	experience	would	cast	it in	a	dangerous	rather	than	positive	light.	In	this	respect,	attitudinal-representational properties	are	deeply	different	from	content-representational	properties.	But	because	they are	nonetheless	representational	properties,	properties	that	do	not	get	instantiated independently	of	the	representing	of	things,	when	we	introspect	our	phenomenal	states	we do	not	encounter	anything	beyond	those	states'	representings.	Introspection	itself	cannot tell	apart	–	at	least	not	very	easily	–	whether	an	introspected	experience	represents	x	as	F or	represents-as-F	x.	For	example,	while	introspection	can	tell	that	our	fear	of	a	snake involves	both	a	snaky	phenomenology	and	a	danger	phenomenology,	and	indeed	that	the two	are	connected,	it	cannot	tell	whether	the	fear	represents	the	snake	as	dangerous	or represents-as-dangerous	the	snake.	That	is,	it	cannot	tell	us	whether	the	relevant representational	property	is	a	content	property	or	an	attitudinal	property.	Or	at	least,	it cannot	tell	this	with	the	kind	of	ease	and	confidence	that	those	who	wield	the	transparency observation	tend	to	expect.	In	other	words,	we	can	confidently	assert	T3,	but	not	T2,	let alone	T1.3 10 Perhaps	a	suitably	trained	introspection	could	(help)	instruct	us	on	such	matters. But	in	any	case,	nothing	in	the	literature	on	transparency	addresses	the	envisaged	kind	of subtle	introspective	exercise.	On	the	contrary,	that	literature	takes	the	introspective deliverance	it	focuses	on	as	obvious,	requiring	no	patient	dwelling	and	examining.	My	claim is	that	all	that	is	delivered	therein	is	the	much	more	coarse-grained	truth	that	nothing	we encounter	in	introspection	goes	beyond	the	representational.	That	the	properties encountered	in	introspection	are	content	properties	rather	than	attitudinalrepresentational	properties	is	something	nobody	has	ever	shown.	So	while	there	is	an important	introspective	insight	at	the	heart	of	the	transparency	claim,	such	theses	as	T1 and	T2	are	not	simple	articulations	of	what	introspection	delivers,	but	layer	questionable philosophical	interpretation	on	top	of	what	is	strictly	delivered	by	introspection.4 3 For-me-ness Phenomenal	characters	can	vary,	I	have	argued,	not	only	in	content-based	ways	but	also	in attitude-based	ways.	There	is	a	difference	between	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	see	red	and what	it	is	like	for	me	to	see	blue,	but	there	is	also	a	difference	between	what	it	is	like	for	me to	see	red	and	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	imagine	red.	Presumably,	however,	there	is	also something	that	remains	invariant	across	all	phenomenal	characters	–	a	certain commonality	of	phenomenal	characters	that	marks	them	as	a	natural	group	of	phenomena and	distinguishes	them	from	other	phenomena.	There	is	something	in	common	between what	it	is	like	for	me	to	see	red,	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	see	blue,	and	what	it	is	like	for	me to	imagine	red.	The	commonality,	we	may	say,	is	there	being	something	it	is	like	for	me. In	this	'something	it	is	like	for	me,'	the	element	designated	by	'something'	appears	to involve	a	kind	of	merely	formal	commonality	–	'something'	functions	as	a	variable	that simply	ranges	over	the	myriad	different	ways	it	could	be	like	for	me	to	be	in	some conscious	state.	But	there	is	also	another	element,	or	aspect,	of	'something	it	is	like	for	me,' the	one	designated	by	'for	me.'	Call	that	element	the	for-me-ness	of	conscious	states.	This for-me-ness,	I	contend,	is	not	a	merely	formal	commonality	of	phenomenal	characters.	It	is a	substantive	commonality,	something	that	is	common	to	all	phenomenal	characters	but which	we	can	also	isolate	in	thought	and	contemplate	'on	its	own.'	While	the	bluish	way	it is	like	for	me	to	see	blue	is	different	from	the	reddish	way	it	is	like	for	me	to	see	red,	the element	of	for-me-ness	in	these	two	ways-it-is-like-for-me	is	strictly	identical,	and	not	only in	the	sense	that	we	can	define	a	genus,	or	determinable,	of	which	both	bluishness	and reddishness	are	species,	or	determinates,	and	which	qua	genus	or	determinable	remains invariant.	Rather,	there	is	a	very	specific,	very	determinate	aspect	of	bluish-for-me-ness and	reddish-for-me-ness	that	is	common	to	the	two,	namely,	for-me-ness	as	such.	Moreover, I	want	to	say,	for-me-ness	is	not	just	a	(substantive)	commonality	among	all	conscious 11 states,	but	is	also	a	peculiarity	of	theirs:	nonconscious	mental	states	occur	in	me,	but	are	not for	me	in	the	relevant	sense.	As	a	substantive	commonality	that	is	also	peculiar	to	its conscious	states,	for-me-ness	is	on	this	view	effectively	'the	mark	of	the	conscious.' How	exactly	should	we	characterize	for-me-ness	as	such?	The	issue	is	vexed	and entire	volumes	can	and	should	be	dedicated	to	it.	My	thought	here	is	that	introducing	forme-ness	as	the	substantive	commonality	among	all	phenomenal	characters	might	be	the least	committal	way	to	home	in	on	it;	we	can	later	debate	the	exact	profile	of	this substantive	commonality. Introducing	for-me-ness	as	the	substantive	commonality	among	all	phenomenal characters,	hence	among	all	conscious	states,	brings	in	two	dimensions.	On	the	one	hand, for-me-ness	should	be	thought	of	as	just	a	commonality	across	phenomenal	properties,	in that	it	is	not	some	detachable,	self-standing	quale	that	can	occur	on	its	own	(Zahavi	2014). There	is	no	phenomenal	character	exhausted	by	the	presence	of	for-me-ness.	For-me-ness is	always	the	for-me-ness	of	some	concrete	felt	content	(and/or	attitude).	It	is	not	a	quale	in its	own	right,	but	a	standing	dimension	of	any	and	every	specific	quale	–	a	sine	qua	non	for all	qualia.	(I	use	'qualia'	here	to	denote	phenomenal	characters,	or	perhaps	components	of such;	I	do	not	use	it	in	a	way	that	implies	a	non-representational	status.)	On	the	other	hand, although	for-me-ness	is	just	a	commonality	among	phenomenal	characters,	and	cannot constitute	a	phenomenal	character	all	by	itself,	it	does	have	a	substantive	nature,	one	that makes	a	specific	contribution	to	(every)	phenomenal	character.	This	distinctive contribution	can	be	isolated	in	thought,	as	a	kind	of	subjective	significance	whereby	all	the subject's	experiences	are	present	to	her.	Every	experience	is	experienced	by	the	subject, and	is	so	in	a	way	that	goes	beyond	the	mere	grammatical	appropriateness	of	the	cognate accusative:	we	do	not	experience	our	experiences	just	in	the	sense	in	which	we	smile	our smiles	and	dance	our	dances,	but	in	a	fuller,	more	substantive	sense	that	captures	the	forme-ness	of	experiences. Note	well:	in	saying	this,	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	the	subject	must	be	somehow aware	of	herself,	or	of	some	'me,'	in	having	her	experiences.	Rather,	she	may	be	aware	just of	the	experiences,	and	it	is	this	awareness	that	makes	these	experiences	for	her.	If	we	use the	label	'mineness'	to	designate	the	more	robust	phenomenon	of	awareness	of	oneself	in addition	to	one's	experiences,	we	could	put	the	point	by	saying	that	for-me-ness	need	not amount	to	mineness.	On	my	view	it	is	only	the	thinner	phenomenon	of	for-me-ness	that constitutes	the	mark	of	the	conscious,	the	substantive	commonality	among	(and	peculiarity of)	all	conscious	states.5 As	a	mere	commonality	and	yet	a	substantive	one,	for-me-ness	serves	a	double function	as	both	(i)	a	component	among	others	in	a	conscious	state's	overall	phenomenal character	and	(ii)	a	precondition	for	the	existence	of	all	other	phenomenal	components	(as 12 phenomenal	components).	Compare	the	keystone	of	a	thirteen-stone	masonry	arch.	On	the one	hand,	it	is	a	stone	among	others	composing	the	arch,	as	intrinsically	'beefy'	as	the	other twelve.	On	the	other	hand,	if	we	remove	it	the	whole	arch	collapses,	and	to	that	extent	it	is	a precondition	for	there	being	any	other	arch-component.	(If	the	arch	collapses,	the individual	stones	do	not	disappear,	but	they	are	no	longer	arch-components.	By	the	same token,	if	a	conscious	representation	of	a	red	surface	loses	its	for-me-ness,	the representation	of	the	red	surface	need	not	disappear	–	it	may	become	a	subpersonal representation	–	but	it	is	no	longer	a	phenomenal	property.6) All	this	is	of	course	highly	controversial.	Many	philosophers	have	denied	the	very existence	of	for-me-ness	(Dretske	1993,	Schear	2009).	But	such	philosophers	owe	us	an alternative	account	of	the	substantive	commonality	among	conscious	states,	or	an argument	to	the	effect	that	there	is	no	substantive	commonality	among	conscious	states.	In that	respect,	for-me-ness	is	not	just	phenomenologically	compelling,	but	also	does	a	certain explanatory	work,	insofar	as	it	accounts	for	the	apparent	substantive	commonality	across experiences. A	representationalist	might	suggest	that	the	substantive	commonality	among	all conscious	states	is	precisely	their	contentfulness.	But	in	fact	most	representationalists accept	that	nonconscious	states	are	often	contentful	as	well	(tacit	beliefs,	repressed	desires, and	subpersonal	perceptual	representations	are	some	examples).	Citing	phenomenal contentfulness	as	the	ultimate	substantive	commonality	only	raises	the	question	of	what makes	an	instance	of	contentfulness	phenomenal.	(My	answer:	its	for-me-ness!)	Some representationalists	have	cited	a	special	kind	of	functional	role	as	common	to	all	conscious representations	and	distinguishing	them	from	nonconscious	ones	(Tye	1995).	But	a commonality	of	functional	role	is	not	a	phenomenal	commonality,	if	only	because	a	state's functional	role	is	a	dispositional	property,	whereas	phenomenality	is	an	occurrent, categorical	property.7 Introducing	the	phenomenon	of	for-me-ness	as	the	substantive	commonality	among all	conscious	experiences	is	useful	in	resisting	certain	undue	theoretical	expectations.	In particular,	I	have	in	mind	the	potential	expectation	that	we	should	be	able	to	use	something like	'phenomenal	contrast'	(Siegel	2007)	to	bring	for-me-ness	into	sharper	relief.	The contrast	method	has	become	so	pervasive	in	current	philosophy	of	consciousness	that some	might	expect	a	contrast	argument	for	for-me-ness.	But	the	expectation	is	unfulfillable in	the	case	of	any	phenomenal	feature	necessarily	present	in	every	conscious	state	(see McClelland,	this	volume).	For	the	contrast	method	attempts	to	isolate	phenomenal	features by	juxtaposing	experiences	in	which	they	are	present	and	ones	in	which	they	are	absent	(or else	experiences	where	there	is	variation	in	the	determinates	of	the	same	phenomenal determinable);	whereas	it	is	in	the	very	nature	of	for-me-ness	to	be	invariant	across,	and yet	present	in,	each	and	every	conscious	experience. 13 My	point	is	that	the	contrast	method	is	blind	in	principle	to	any	absolutely ubiquitous	and	invariant	feature	of	experience,	hence	to	any	property	constitutive	of	the very	possibility	of	having	a	conscious	experience.	It	is	simply	ill	suited	for	making	manifest any	such	feature.	Consider	the	following	case.	Sometimes,	we	only	notice	that	the refrigerator	has	been	humming	when	it	stops	humming.	But	the	fact	that	we	only	notice	it then	does	not	mean	we	did	not	experience	it	while	it	was	humming.	Arguably,	when	the refrigerator	stops	humming	there	is	an	immediate	change	in	our	overall	phenomenology	– which	suggests	that	the	humming	was	part	of	our	overall	phenomenology	before	it	stopped. Now,	we	can	imagine	a	world	–	call	it	'Fridge	World'	–	where	people	are	born	with	a	tiny irremovable	object	in	the	back	of	their	necks,	which	is	too	small	to	detect	with	the	naked eye	but	which	hums	audibly	throughout	their	lives.	Arguably,	it	is	impossible	for	these people	to	use	the	phenomenal	contrast	method	to	bring	into	sharper	relief	the	pervasive presence	of	this	humming	quality	in	their	experience.	Yet	if	the	hum	were	to	stop,	there would	be	a	change	in	their	overall	phenomenology,	indeed	a	noticeable	change	(though	how exactly	they	would	conceptualize	the	change	is	an	open	question).	This	suggests	that	the hum	is	phenomenally	real	but	'invisible'	to	the	contrast	method. There	are	important	differences	between	the	hum	in	Fridge	World	and	for-me-ness in	the	actual	world.	For	one	thing,	for-me-ness,	as	understood	here,	is	not	only	ubiquitous in	conscious	experience,	but	is	necessarily	so.	Accordingly,	the	corresponding counterfactual	is	more	complicated	for	it:	if	for-me-ness	were	extinguished,	one	would	not simply	have	a	different	kind	of	experience,	but	would	stop	experiencing	altogether	(one would	turn	into	a	zombie).	In	both	the	hum	quale	and	for-me-ness,	though,	the	absolute universality	of	the	relevant	dimension	of	experience	means	that	it	cannot	be	made	manifest using	the	contrast	method.	Something	more	circuitous	is	needed	if	we	are	to	fix	on	the relevant	phenomenon.	The	present	suggestion	is	simply	to	try	to	grasp	that	which	(i) remains	invariant	across	all	conscious	experiences	but	(ii)	can	be	thought	(though	cannot occur)	in	isolation	from	any	specific	type	of	conscious	experience.	This	is	just	trying	to grasp	the	substantive	commonality	among	all	phenomenal	characters. ge Elsewhere,	I	have	argued	that	for-me-ness	is	also	compatible	with	the	transparency	of experience	(Kriegel	2009	Ch.5).	It	might	be	thought	that	a	version	of	the	transparency thesis	would	undermine	the	notion	that	for-me-ness	is	phenomenally	real.	Consider	the following	relatively	weak	version	of	transparency: (T4)	When	we	introspect	our	phenomenal	states,	we	are	only	aware	of	these	states' first-order	representational	properties. T4	is	weaker	than	T1	and	T2,	inasmuch	as	it	makes	a	claim	about	representational properties	rather	than	representational	contents	or	represented	environmental	features. 14 At	the	same	time,	it	is	stronger	than	T3,	insofar	as	it	requires	our	introspected	phenomenal properties	to	be	not	just	representational	properties	but	first-order	representational properties.	This	is	intended	to	rule	out	higher-order	and	self-representational	properties, such	as	a	state's	property	of	representing	itself	to	represent	red.	Arguably,	the	proponents of	transparency	do	not	have	such	higher-order	and	self-representational	properties	in mind	when	they	assert	transparency.	Thus	T4	captures	a	relatively	modest	version	of transparency.	Yet	it	appears	to	threaten	the	phenomenological	reality	of	for-me-ness,	since the	latter	does	not	seem	to	be	a	first-order	representational	property.8 On	the	plausible	assumption	that	for-me-ness	is	not	a	first-order	representational property,	its	phenomenal	reality	is	indeed	incompatible	with	the	thesis	that	all	phenomenal properties	are	first-order	representational	properties.	But	I	would	argue	that	that	the	way T4	motivates	the	thesis	that	all	phenomenal	properties	are	first-order	representational properties	involves	two	inferential	steps,	and	both	are	problematic.	The	first	step	involves the	following	assumption:	if	when	we	introspect	our	phenomenal	states,	we	are	only	aware of	their	first-order	representational	properties,	then	plausibly,	all	the	phenomenal properties	our	conscious	states	actually	instantiate	when	we	introspect	them	are	firstorder	representational	properties.	(In	other	words,	phenomenal	properties	do	not	remain in-principle-hidden	from	introspection	while	we	introspect.)	The	second	step	makes another	assumption:	if	all	the	phenomenal	properties	our	conscious	states	instantiate when	we	introspect	them	are	first-order	representational	properties,	then	plausibly,	all	the phenomenal	properties	our	conscious	states	instantiate	at	any	time	are	first-order representational	properties.	(That	is,	there	are	no	phenomenal	properties	that	show	up only	when	we	do	not	introspect.)	The	point	I	want	to	make	in	the	remainder	of	this	section is	that	the	proponent	of	for-me-ness	need	not	deny	T4	itself;	she	can	instead	deny	one	or both	of	these	assumptions. There	are	certainly	examples	of	the	second	assumption	failing	–	cases	where	a conscious	state	instantiates	a	certain	phenomenal	property	so	long	as	it	is	not	introspected, but	where	the	introspecting	of	that	state	destroys	the	relevant	phenomenal	property. Brentano	(1874:	29-30)	offered	as	an	example	the	quality	of	intense	anger.	It	is	in	the nature	of	a	certain	kind	of	intense	anger	–	rage,	or	fury	–	to	be	consuming.	The	subject	who is	not	fully	consumed	by	her	anger,	who	maintains	a	certain	emotional	distance	from	it	and clear-headedness	with	respect	to	it,	is	not	an	enraged	or	infuriated	subject.	But	the	very	act of	introspecting	one's	anger	means	that	one	is	no	longer	consumed	by	it.	In	a	way,	one becomes	a	partly	angry	person	and	partly	introspecting	person,	and	has	thereby	taken some	distance	from	the	anger.	One	is	no	longer	identified	with	one's	anger.	To	that	extent, the	peculiar	phenomenology	of	rage	or	fury	is	a	phenomenology	we	cannot	undergo	when we	introspect	–	the	introspecting	of	our	experience	destroys	its	furious,	consuming	quality. This	shows	that	even	if	all	the	phenomenal	properties	our	conscious	states	instantiate 15 when	we	introspect	them	are	of	a	certain	type	T,	there	may	still	be	phenomenal	properties our	conscious	states	instantiate	when	not	introspected	which	are	not	of	that	type.9 There	may	also	be	cases	where	a	conscious	state's	phenomenal	property	is	not introspectible,	but	not	because	it	is	destroyed	by	the	introspecting	of	that	state.	It	persists through	the	introspecting	and	yet	evades	introspective	detection.	This	may	seem	initially strange,	but	it	falls	out	of	a	certain	conception	of	the	relationship	between	for-me-ness	and introspection	(Kriegel	2009	Ch.5).	I	cannot	argue	here	for	the	relevant	conception,	but	I	can summarize	it.	On	this	view,	most	conscious	states	'live'	in	our	stream	of	consciousness unintrospected,	and	for	those,	their	for-me-ness	consists	in	a	certain	(i)	inbuilt	(ii) peripheral	awareness	of	their	occurrence.	The	awareness	is	'inbuilt'	in	the	following	sense: in	order	to	have	the	relevant	awareness	of	one's	current	conscious	state,	one	need	not	be	in any	numerically	distinct	mental	state;	rather,	it	is	in	virtue	of	being	in	that	very	conscious state	that	one	is	aware	of	its	occurrence.	And	the	awareness	is	'peripheral'	in	that	it	does not	occupy	the	focus	of	one's	attention,	but	is	more	akin	to	peripheral	vision,	say,	or	to fringe	tactile	awareness	of	the	soles	of	one's	shoes.10	However,	it	is	part	of	the	view	that once	a	subject	introspects,	what	happens	is	that	the	same	old	inbuilt	awareness	of	one's conscious	state	ceases	to	be	peripheral	and	becomes	focal.	Thus	to	introspect	is	not	to enter	a	new	and	distinct	mental	state,	but	rather	to	have	one's	inbuilt	awareness	become attentive	and	central.	The	inbuilt	awareness	is	a	ubiquitous	dimension	of	our	conscious	life, but	while	it	remains	peripheral	during	most	of	our	conscious	life,	it	becomes	focal	when	we introspect.	And	just	as,	in	this	picture,	the	for-me-ness	of	a	non-introspected	conscious state	consists	in	the	subject's	inbuilt	peripheral	awareness	of	that	state,	the	for-me-ness	of an	introspected	conscious	state	consists	in	the	subject's	inbuilt	focal	awareness	of	that	state. If	we	accept	this	picture	of	the	relationship	between	for-me-ness	and	introspection, it	is	only	to	be	expected	that	whenever	we	introspect	our	conscious	state,	the	for-me-ness is	not	one	of	the	things	introspection	reveals	to	us.	For	the	for-me-ness	of	an	introspected state	is	the	introspecting	itself,	the	revealing	to	us	of	the	rest	of	the	state's	phenomenal character	(namely,	its	content-based	and	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties).	So	it turns	out	that	there	is	at	least	one	phenomenal	property	that	remains	in	principle	hidden from	introspection	while	we	introspect:	introspection	does	not	reveal	the	introspecting,	yet the	introspecting	does	contribute	to	the	overall	way	it	is	like	for	the	introspector.	(There	is a	felt	difference	between	seeing	a	blue	sky	and	introspecting	seeing	a	blue	sky!)	The contribution	the	introspecting	makes	does	not	have	to	do	with	any	of	the	phenomenal elements	given	in	one's	introspective	awareness,	but	is	the	felt	given-ness	itself. 4 Conclusion:	Concentric	Circles	of	Phenomenality? 16 In	summary,	in	addition	to	content-based	phenomenal	properties,	there	are	two	other types	of	phenomenal	property:	attitude-based	ones	and	for-me-ness.	Both	of	these constitute	a	certain	blindspot	for	the	transparency	thesis,	though	for	different	reasons. If	we	accept	the	views	presented	in	§§2-3,	there	are	at	least	two	substantive commonalities	among	(i)	an	episodic	memory	of	a	brown	dog,	(ii)	an	episodic	memory	of	a white	dog,	(iii)	an	episodic	memory	of	a	purple	butterfly,	and	(iv)	an	episodic	memory	of the	sound	of	a	distant	bagpipe.	One	thing	common	to	(i)-(iv)	is	the	for-me-ness	they	all involve.	Another	is	the	attitudinal	phenomenal	property	of	representing-as-past characteristic	of	episodic	memory.	I	now	want	to	compare	three	models	of	the	latter's	role in	the	composition	of	what	it	is	like	to	undergo	(i)-(iv).	I	call	them	the	'salad	model,'	the 'tree	model,'	and	the	'circles	model.'	Each	will	cast	in	a	different	light	the	interrelations among	content-based	phenomenal	properties,	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties,	and for-me-ness. The	salad	model.	On	this	model,	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically	remember	a brown	dog	is	fixed	by	the	combination	of	three	separate	experiential	'ingredients':	browndog	phenomenology,	episodic-remembering	phenomenology,	and	for-me-ness.	The phenomenal	character	of	remembering	a	brown	dog	is	simply	the	'sum'	of	the	phenomenal contributions	made	by	each	of	these.	But	each	is	a	'detachable'	ingredient	that	could recombine	with	other	phenomenal	ingredients	to	form	different	experiences.	For	example, the	(content-based)	brown-dog	phenomenology	could	combine	with	(the	attitude-based) imaginative	phenomenology	and	with	for-me-ness	to	compose	what	it	is	like	for	me	to imagine	a	brown	dog;	the	(attitude-based)	episodic-memory	phenomenology	could combine	with	(the	content-based)	purple-butterfly	phenomenology	and	with	for-me-ness to	compose	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically	remember	a	purple	butterfly;	and	so	on. The	salad	model	is	perhaps	the	most	straightforward,	least	theoretically	involved model	of	the	composition	of	phenomenal	character.	However,	there	are	facts	it	fails	to explain.	Most	notably,	it	does	not	explain	why	no	content-based	phenomenal	property	can constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	some	experience	all	by	itself	–	why,	that	is,	a content-based	phenomenal	property	must	interlock	with	some	attitude-based	phenomenal property	(and	for-me-ness)	to	generate	phenomenal	character.	This	fact	becomes	a	brute basic	fact	about	the	phenomenal	domain.	The	salad	model	also	does	not	explain	the	special status	of	for-me-ness	as	a	substantive	commonality	among	all	phenomenal	characters.	If	a phenomenal	character	is	just	a	free	combination	of	various	ingredients,	why	does	one ingredient	show	up	in	every	known	combo? The	tree	model.	The	second	model	has	the	potential	to	illuminate	the	features	left unexplained	by	the	first	model.	Here	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically	remember	a brown	dog	is	not	understood	as	a	composite	of	three	detachable	ingredients,	but	as	a 17 species	of	a	certain	genus,	namely,	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically	remember something.	Another	species	of	the	same	genus	is	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically remember	a	purple	butterfly	and	yet	another	is	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically remember	a	bagpipe	sound.	All	these	different	species	have	a	substantive	commonality among	them,	namely,	the	attitude-based	phenomenal	property	of	representing-as-past.	The genus	itself,	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	episodically	remember	(something,	anything),	is	itself	a species	of	an	even	higher	genus,	namely,	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	have	an	experience	(any experience).	Other	species	of	this	higher	genus	include	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	perceive something,	what	it	is	like	for	me	to	imagine	something,	and	so	on.	Here	the	substantive commonality	among	all	the	species	is	for-me-ness,	which	serves	as	the	summum	genus	of the	phenomenal	realm.	Thus	we	obtain	an	elegant	picture	of	the	relationship	between content-based	phenomenal	properties,	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties,	and	for-meness.	There	is	a	kind	of	taxonomic	tree	of	conscious	experiences	in	which	we	can	identify four	main	sections.	(1)	Atop	the	tree	is	the	summum	genus	Conscious	Experience,	whose mark	is	for-me-ness;	(2)	below	it	are	species	such	as	Episodic-Memory	Experience, Imaginative	Experience,	and	Emotional	Experience;	(3)	below	those	are	subspecies	such	as Episodic	Memory	of	Brown	Dog,	Episodic	Memory	of	Purple	Butterfly,	and	so	on;	(4)	at	the bottom	of	the	tree	is	the	enormous	variety	of	maximally	determinate	types	of	experience, such	as	token	episodic	memories	of	some	particular	brown	dog	of	particular	shape	and color.	For-me-ness	is	then	understood	as	the	substantive	commonality	unifying	the	highest genus;	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	constitute	the	substantive	commonalities unifying	the	second-layer	species;	while	content-based	phenomenal	properties	provide	the substantive	commonalities	that	unify	the	third-layer	subspecies. The	tree	model	is	doubtless	more	elegant	than	the	salad	model	in	the	structure	it imposes	on	the	phenomenal	realm.	It	also	manages	to	explain	what	the	salad	model	did	not, namely,	(i)	that	content-based	phenomenal	properties	cannot	be	instantiated	without	some attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	being	instantiated	and	(ii)	that	no	phenomenal property	can	be	instantiated	in	the	absence	of	for-me-ness.	The	explanation	is	simply	that there	are	genus-species	relations	among	these	dimensions	of	phenomenality,	and	the relevant	patterns	of	co-instantiation	are	characteristic	of	the	genus-species	relation:	just	as the	property	of	being	a	cat	cannot	be	instantiated	without	the	property	of	being	a	mammal being	instantiated,	which	in	turn	cannot	be	instantiated	without	the	property	of	animality being	instantiated,	so	content-based	phenomenal	properties	cannot	be	instantiated without	some	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	being	instantiated,	and	the	latter cannot	be	instantiated	without	for-me-ness	being	instantiated. At	the	same	time,	there	is	also	a	fairly	simple	and	fundamental	fact	about	the phenomenal	realm	that	the	tree	model	fails	to	explain,	namely,	that	while	one	can episodically	remember	a	brown	dog,	one	can	also	visually	perceive	a	brown	dog,	as	well	as 18 visually	imagine	a	brown	dog	–	and	there	is	a	substantive	phenomenal	commonality	among those.	The	natural	explanation	of	this	commonality	is	that	there	is	a	content-based phenomenal	'ingredient'	that	reappears	in	each	of	them	–	a	certain	brown-dog phenomenology...	This	explanation	is	natural	within	the	salad	model,	but	is	unavailable	on the	tree	model.	If	what	it	is	like	to	visually	imagine	a	brown	dog	is	just	a	subspecies	of	one phenomenal	species,	while	what	it	is	like	to	episodically	remember	a	brown	dog	is	a subspecies	of	a	completely	different	phenomenal	species,	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	any similarities	between	them.	In	zoology,	it	is	considered	a	curious	fact	requiring	special explanation	that	wings	have	evolved	on	four	different	occasions:	in	birds,	bats,	pterosaurs, and	some	insects.	The	reason	it	is	considered	a	curious	fact	in	need	of	special	explanation	is that	since	bats	are	mammals	and	pterosaurs	are	reptiles,	wings	appear	to	constitute	a commonality	among	species	that	belong	to	different	genera.11	It	would	be	an	odder	fact	in need	of	special	explanation	that	content-based	phenomenal	properties	reappear	routinely in	species	of	many	independent	phenomenal	genera. In	fact,	what	prevents	us	from	constructing	a	tree	in	which	the	attitude-level	is represented	as	a	species	of	the	content-level,	rather	than	the	other	way	round?	Thus,	what it	is	like	to	episodically	remember	a	brown	dog,	what	it	is	like	to	visually	imagine	a	brown dog,	and	what	it	is	like	to	visually	perceive	a	brown	dog	could	be	seen	as	three	subspecies of	brown-dog	experience.	Treating	attitudinal	properties	as	'higher'	(more	generic)	than content	properties	would	appear	arbitrary.	The	only	reason	we	are	tempted	to	subordinate the	content-level	to	the	attitude-level,	rather	than	the	other	way	round,	seems	to	do	with cardinality:	there	are	simply	many	more	content-based	phenomenal	properties	than attitude-based	ones.12	Since	there	are	also	many	more	species	than	genera,	we	are	inclined, once	we	have	chosen	the	genus-species	model,	to	see	content-based	phenomenal properties	as	species	of	attitude-based	ones.	However,	it	remains	that	the	content-based and	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	can	combine	in	crosscutting	ways	fairly	freely	– something	the	tree	model	does	not	capture. The	circles	model.	The	salad	and	tree	models'	shortcomings	had	to	do	with	failure	to capture	certain	apparent	patterns	of	co-instantiation	among	our	three	types	of	phenomenal property.	We	may	summarize	those	patterns	in	six	principles: (P1)	A	content-based	phenomenal	property	cannot	be	instantiated	without	some attitude-based	phenomenal	property	being	instantiated	(and	vice	versa!). (P2)	Neither	content-based	nor	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	can	be instantiated	without	for-me-ness	being	instantiated. (P3)	Some	conscious	states	vary	in	their	content-based	phenomenal	properties	while remaining	invariant	in	their	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties. (P4)	Some	conscious	states	vary	in	their	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	while remaining	invariant	in	their	content-based	phenomenal	properties. 19 (P5)	In	the	set	of	all	conscious	states,	one	finds	variation	in	both	contentand	attitudebased	phenomenal	properties,	but	for-me-ness	as	such	remains	invariant. (P6)	There	are	considerably	more	content-based	phenomenal	properties	than	attitudebased	phenomenal	properties	(and	only	one	for-me-ness	property). Already	P1	and	P2	count	against	the	salad	model,	where	for-me-ness,	for	instance,	was seen	as	a	self-standing	detachable	quale	that	simply	happened	to	attach	to	every	other known	quale.	For-me-ness	is	certainly	not	such	a	self-standing	quale,	but	rather	an invariant	dimension	across	all	phenomenal	characters.	P4	counts	heavily	against	the	tree model,	meanwhile,	despite	the	blunting	force	of	P6.	The	genus-species	relation	is	simply	ill suited	to	capture	the	structure	of	the	phenomenal	realm	given	that	substantive commonalities	run	across	the	content-level	and	attitude-level	alike. What	I	propose	under	the	fancy	name	'circles	model'	is	forsooth	just	an	acceptance of	P1-P6,	plus	an	image.	The	image	is	of	three	(gapless)	concentric	circles,	with	contentbased	phenomenal	properties	at	the	outskirts,	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	in the	middle,	and	for-me-ness	as	the	nucleus	(Figure	1).	The	image	is	not	supposed	to visually	represent	all	the	relationships	laid	out	in	P1-P6.	But	it	is	supposed	to	be compatible	with	them,	and	to	avoid	the	problematic	features	of	the	salad	and	tree	images. In	using	circles	rather	than	tree-branches,	it	makes	sense	of	the	notion	that	different content-based	properties	can	combine	with	different	attitude-based	ones,	rather	than being	'accessible'	only	to	one	attitude-level	property.	In	using	continuous	circles,	it	avoids the	image	of	detachable	qualia	that	can	in	principle	occur	on	their	own	(thus	respecting	the notion	that	content	phenomenality,	attitudinal	phenomenality,	and	for-me-ness	are	but three	dimensions	of	a	phenomenal	character	–	dimensions	which	can	be	separated	in thought	but	cannot	occur	separately).	The	core	of	the	three-circle	model	is	really	just	the insistence	that	all	six	principles	are	true	of	the	structure	of	the	phenomenal	realm.13 20 Figure	1.	The	three	circles	of	consciousness References § Arcangeli,	M.	and	U.	Kriegel.	Ms.	'Intentionalism,	Transparency,	and	Imaginative	Phenomenology.' § Armstrong,	D.M.	1968.	A	Materialist	Theory	of	the	Mind.	New	York:	Humanities	Press. § Bayne,	T.	and	M.	Montague	2011.	Cognitive	Phenomenology.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. § Block,	N.J.	1996.	'Mental	Paint	and	Mental	Latex.'	Philosophical	Issues	7:	19-50. § Brentano,	F.	1874.	Psychology	from	Empirical	Standpoint.	Edited	by	O.	Kraus.	Translated	by	A.C. Rancurello,	D.B.	Terrell,	and	L.L.	McAlister.	London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul,	1973. § Byrne,	A.	2001.	'Intentionalism	Defended.'	Philosophical	Review	110:	199–240. § Chalmers,	D.J.	2004.	'The	Representational	Character	of	Experience.'	In	B.	Leiter	(ed.),	The	Future	of Philosophy.	Oxford	and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. § Crane,	T.	1998.	'Intentionality	as	the	Mark	of	the	Mental.'	In	A.	O'Hear	(ed.),	Contemporary	Issues	in Philosophy	of	Mind.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. § Crane,	T.	2003.	'The	Intentional	Structure	of	Consciousness.'	In	A.	Jokic	and	Q.	Smith	(eds.), Consciousness:	New	Philosophical	Perspectives.	Oxford	and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. § Dretske,	F.I.	1993.	'Conscious	Experience.'	Mind	102:	263-283. § Dretske,	F.I.	1995.	Naturalizing	the	Mind.	Cambridge	MA:	MIT	Press. § Dretske,	F.I.	2000.	'Reply	to	Lopes.'	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	60:	455-459. § Fernández,	J.	2006.	'The	Intentionality	of	Memory.'	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy	84:	39-57. § Frege,	G.	1884.	The	Foundations	of	Arithmetic.	Trans.	J.L.	Austin.	Oxford:	Blackwell,	1974. § Goldman,	A.I.	1993.	"The	Psychology	of	Folk	Psychology."	Behavioral	and	Brain	Sciences	16:	15-28. for-me-ness attitude-based content-based 21 § Horgan,	T.	and	J.	Tienson	2002.	'The	Intentionality	of	Phenomenology	and	the	Phenomenology	of Intentionality.'	In	D.J.	Chalmers	(ed.),	Philosophy	of	Mind:	Classical	and	Contemporary	Readings. Oxford	and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. § Kind,	A.	2013.	'The	Case	against	Representationalism	about	Moods.'	In	U.	Kriegel	(ed.),	Current Controversies	in	Philosophy	of	Mind.	London:	Routledge. § Kriegel,	U.	2007.	'Intentional	Inexistence	and	Phenomenal	Intentionality.'	Philosophical Perspectives	21:	307-340. § Kriegel,	U.	2009.	Subjective	Consciousness:	A	Self-Representational	Theory.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. § Kriegel,	U.	2015a.	The	Varieties	of	Consciousness.	Oxford	and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. § Kriegel,	U.	2015b.	'Experiencing	the	Present.'	Analysis	75:	407-413. § Kriegel	U.	2017.	'Brentano's	Evaluative-Attitudinal	Account	of	Will	and	Emotion.'	Revue	Philosophique. § Kriegel,	U.	forthcoming-a.	'Reductive	Representationalism	and	Attitudinal	Representation.'	Midwest Studies	in	Philosophy	41. § Kriegel,	U.	Forthcoming-b.	'An	Argument	for	the	Awareness	Principle.' § Kriegel,	U.	Ms.	'An	Attitudinal	Account	of	Mood.'	In	preparation. § Loar,	B.	2003.	'Phenomenal	Intentionality	as	the	Basis	for	Mental	Content.'	In	M.	Hahn	and	B. Ramberg	(eds.),	Reflections	and	Replies:	Essays	on	the	Philosophy	of	Tyler	Burge.	Cambridge	MA:	MIT Press. § Lopes,	D.M.M.	2000.	'What	Is	It	Like	to	See	with	Your	Ears?	The	Representational	Theory	of	Mind.' Philosophical	and	Phenomenological	Research	60:	439-453. § Lycan,	W.G.	2001.	'The	Case	for	Phenomenal	Externalism.'	Philosophical	Perspectives	15:	17-35. § Pautz,	A.	2010.	'Consciousness:	A	Simple	Approach.'	In	R.	Koons	and	G.	Bealer	(eds.),	The	Waning	of Materialism.	Oxford	and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. § Peacocke,	C.	1983.	Sense	and	Content.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. § Pitt,	D.	2004.	'The	Phenomenology	of	Cognition;	or	What	Is	It	Like	to	Think	that	P?'	Philosophy	and Phenomenological	Research	69:	1-36. § Russell,	B.	1905.	'Review	of	A.	Meinong,	Untersuchungen	zur	Gegenstandstheorie	und	Psychologie.' Mind	14:	530–538. § Sartre,	J.-P.	1940.	The	Imaginary.	Trans.	J.M.	Webber.	London:	Routledge,	2004. § Schear,	J.	2009.	'Experience	and	Self-consciousness.'	Philosophical	Studies	144:	95-105. § Seager,	W.	1999.	Theories	of	Consciousness.	London:	Routledge. § Searle,	J.R.	1983.	Intentionality.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. § Siegel,	S.	2007.	'How	Can	We	Discover	the	Contents	of	Experience?'	Southern	Journal	of	Philosophy (supplement)	45:	127-142. § Stampe,	D.	1987.	'The	Authority	of	Desire.'	Philosophical	Review	96:	335-381. § Szabó,	Z.	2003.	'Believing	in	Things.'	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	66:	584-611. § Tenenbaum,	S.	2007.	Appearances	of	the	Good.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. § Textor,	M.	2007.	'Seeing	Something	and	Believing	IN	It.'	In	M.M.	McCabe	and	M.	Textor	(eds.), Perspectives	on	Perception.	Frankfurt:	Ontos. § Tye,	M.	1995.	Ten	Problems	of	Consciousness.	Cambridge	MA:	MIT	Press. § Zahavi,	D.	2014.	Self	and	Other.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. 22 1	I	take	no	stand	here	on	whether	such	episodic	memory's	content	is	given	by	the	rain,	by	the	past	seeing	of the	rain,	or	by	both	(see	Fernández	2006).	Nonetheless,	for	simplicity	I	will	discuss	the	matter	as	though	the object	of	the	episodic	memory	is	some	external	rain. 2	The	version	of	the	account	that	I	favor,	and	which	seems	to	me	to	do	greater	justice	to	the	undirected character	of	moods,	holds	that	moods	are	not	self-standing	mental	states,	but	rather	modifications	of	other mental	states:	one	can	anxiously	perceive,	or	anxiously	remember,	or	anxiously	love,	but	one	cannot	simply anxiousize.	A	mood	contributes	to	one's	overall	experience	a	distinctive	attitudinal	feature,	but	makes	no contributions	of	its	own	at	the	level	of	content.	Thus,	to	anxiously	remember	x	is	to	be	in	a	conscious	state that	both	represents-as-past	and	represents-as-threatening	x;	to	euphorically	love	y	is	to	be	in	a	conscious state	that	both	represents-as-lovely	and	represents-as-exciting	y;	and	so	on. 3	Mindful	that	I	have	not	offered	here	any	arguments	for	the	attitudinal	treatment	of	the	phenomenal properties	I	claimed	above	were	attitudinal,	I	hasten	to	add	that	the	arguments	I	provide	elsewhere	(in	the above-cited	works)	are	not	simple	introspective	assertions.	Part	of	the	reason	is	precisely	that	I	doubt introspection	can	tell	apart	representing	x	as	F	and	representing-as-F	x. 4	This	philosophical	interpretation	is	founded	on	suspect	theoretical	principles,	namely,	that	the representational	character	of	a	mental	state	is	exhausted	by	its	representational	content,	perhaps	even	the character	of	the	represented	environmental	features.	These	principles	embody	a	blindspot	in	contemporary philosophy	of	mind:	the	routine	disregard	or	unawareness	of	attitudinal	properties	of	the	form	representingas-F. 5	My	convictions	in	this	area	are	very	weak,	but	my	inclination	is	to	think	that	for-me-ness	does	amount	to mineness	in	a	normal	human	adult,	but	may	not	in	nonhuman	animals,	children,	and	certain	pathologies (Kriegel	2009	Ch.5). 6	The	analogy	may	be	imperfect,	inasmuch	as	it	is	mostly	the	keystone's	relational	properties	that	confer	on	it its	special	status,	so	that	it	is	substitutable	for	almost	any	stone	used	in	making	up	the	arch;	whereas	for-meness	could	not	swap	roles	with	the	property	of	representing	a	red	surface	for	the	status	of	enabling	all	other phenomenality.	Still,	in	both	cases	there	is	a	single	constituent	of	a	structure	that	is	also	essential	for	the status	of	a	number	of	other	items	as	further	constituents	of	that	structure. 7	There	are	probably	other	antecedently	reasonable	candidates	for	the	substantive	commonality	among conscious	states,	but	for-me-ness	offers	one	clear	such	candidate,	and	the	one	I	am	adopting	here,	admittedly with	little	argument.	For	more	argument,	see	Kriegel	2009,	forthcoming-b. 8	On	the	view	I	have	defended,	for	example,	it	is	rather	constituted	by	a	self-representational	property	of conscious	states	(Kriegel	2009	Ch.4).	It	is	also	possible	to	hold	that	it	is	a	non-representational	property altogether,	a	kind	of	'intrinsic	glow'	inhering	in	conscious	states.	Either	view	is	incompatible	with	the	notion that	all	phenomenal	properties	are	first-order	representational	properties. 9	It	might	be	asked	how	we	know	of	phenomenal	properties	that	disappear	under	introspection.	The	answer is	that	according	to	Brentano,	there	is	a	kind	of	non-introspective	inner	awareness	that	accompanies	all	our conscious	states.	This	is	also	my	view;	I	go	into	it	momentarily. 10	One	can,	of	course,	turns	one's	attention	to	the	periphery	of	one's	visual	field,	or	to	one's	tactile	sensation	of the	soles	of	one's	shoes.	But	in	the	normal	go	of	things,	although	these	are	aspects	of	our	overall	conscious experience,	they	remain	outside	the	focus	of	conscious	attention	–	they	'inhabit'	the	background	or	fringe	of consciousness. 11	I	am	using	'species'	and	'genus'	as	metaphysical	terms	here,	not	zoological	ones.	(In	zoology,	these	terms are	not	used	as	relative	terms,	so	that	x	could	be	a	species	relative	to	y	but	a	genus	relative	to	z;	rather,	they are	used	to	designate	specific	'layers'	in	the	tree-like	taxonomy	of	the	animal	kingdom.) 23 12	If	we	are	diligent	enough,	in	half	an	hour	we	can	comprehensively	enumerate	the	attitude-based phenomenal	properties	characteristic	of	normal	adult	human	conscious	experience;	at	least,	we	can enumerate	all	attitude-based	phenomenal	properties	such	experience	uncontroversially	exhibits,	and	then	all those	it	might	exhibit	(pending	certain	controversies,	such	as	that	surrounding	cognitive	phenomenology).	In contrast,	enumerating	the	content-based	phenomenal	properties	normal	adult	human	conscious	experience exhibits	would	be	an	extremely	tedious	long-term	(indeed	perhaps	interminable)	task. 13	Work	on	this	paper	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency's	grants	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL* and	ANR-10-LABX-0087,	as	well	as	by	grant	675415	of	the	European	Union's	Horizon	2020	Research	and Innovation	program.	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	I	am	grateful	to	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	OUP.	I have	also	greatly	benefited	from	a	discussion	of	the	paper	at	NYU	and	would	like	to	thank	the	audience	there, in	particular	David	Chalmers,	Kevin	Lande,	Andrew	Lee,	Hedda	Mørch,	Gabe	Rabin,	David	Rosenthal,	and Jonathan	Simon.